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Executive Summary
By almost all accounts, the fiscal health and stability of the United States public
retirement system at all levels is in peril. Collectively, local and state public retirement systems
are underfunded at a rate of $700 billion as a low estimate to $3 trillion as a higher estimate.
While plenty of research has been conducted to identify the reasons that programs are
underfunded, the system would be best served if more attention were paid to identifying program
characteristics that improve performance. In turn, these characteristics could be evaluated and
implemented if not already present. If programs do not want to collapse and governments do not
want to cut services to pay for retirement benefits, further research is needed to improve
performance and this report offers one such method of evaluation.
By utilizing some of the most recent financial data available, this report attempts to
identify program governance characteristics that positively impact pension performance.
Performance is measured using the funded ratio of a program or the measure of current assets
compared to liabilities. The tested model is a combination of three main governance
characteristic variables (the presence of an investment council, the total number of program
board members, and the percentage of board members that are program beneficiaries) and
several other independent variables such as total program members. The model has been tested
using an OLS and Mixed Effects regression analysis.
The regression estimates provide interesting but inconsistent results. In regards to the
governance characteristics, only the presence of an investment council has been shown to be
significant over both models. The presence of an investment council raises a programs funded
ratio by more than 7 percentage points in both models. In regards to the remaining independent
variables, of particular note are the estimates on the availability of Social Security coverage to
program participants. In the OLS analysis, the estimated impact is a negative 0.411 percentage
points while the Mixed Effects impact is 2.211 percentage points. Although neither is
statistically significant, the divergent nature of the estimate should be something that is worth
future attention.
By pooling the results over the two models, it is the recommendation of this author that
programs at least consider implementing an investment council for their respective programs for
the reasons outlined above. Programs should also consider limiting their increases to employee
contribution rates as current analysis has shown that a roughly one percent increase in employee
contribution rates decreases the funded ratio by one percent. By implementing the appropriate
board and program characteristics, public retirement systems at all levels could begin to slow or
correct the underfunded problem that has been growing in recent years.
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Problem Statement
In 2012, the PEW Center on the States released a report on the fiscal position of state
pension plans which concluded that collectively, there is a $1.38 trillion gap between pension
liabilities and current funding levels (2012). Although there are states (i.e. Delaware and
Wisconsin) that are considered to be in a sound or solid position, quite a few states are in need
substantial improvement if they are to meet their current and future obligations. Two such states
in poor standing include Illinois and Rhode Island, both of which have less than 50 percent of
their current liabilities funded. Kentucky does not fare much better with only a 54 percent
funding level. To expand on this problem, states are not the only issue. There are many local or
city sponsored public retirement systems that are underfunded as well. In a 2011 Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) brief, it was estimated that as of 2009, public pension systems are
collectively underfunded between $0.7 trillion and $3 trillion, depending on the valuation
method utilized (Russek). The current state of public pension funding is an issue that everybody
should be concerned about no matter what state you live in and regardless of whether or not you
are or will be a program participant.
The underfunding of public pensions should be a concern for everybody in the United
States. The implications of a public entity (state or city) defaulting on its pension obligations
would be far reaching. First, there is the impact felt by pension recipients. A default could lead to
a reduction in benefit payments or their elimination, depending on the state’s constitutional
requirements. While unprecedented at the state level, the local level has experienced such an
elimination of benefits due to poor fiscal. In 2012, the city of Central Falls, Rhode Island exited
bankruptcy proceedings with an agreement to cut its local pension retiree benefits by as much as
55 percent (Russ, 2012). Another example of cities facing looming pension program issues is
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Detroit, MI. As reported by Allison Schrager (2011), lawsuits have already been filed on behalf
of Detroit pension funds to prevent reduction to their benefits as the city faces bankruptcy
proceedings. Second, a default would impact bond investors. Entities obligated to pay benefits
could have to redirect funding set aside for bond payments in order to make up for any shortfall.
In turn, investors would face reduced or delayed interest and principal payments. Lastly, as cities
and states shift funding to pay for pension benefits, other programs and services could suffer
from reduced funding. In turn, the citizens that are served by these services would be adversely
impacted regardless of their status as a retiree. As outlined here, the implications of underfunding
a public pension system could impact not only program participants but also their neighbors and
investors.
There are several reasons that have led to the current financial situation of public pension
systems: (1) poor pension investment performance, (2) unwillingness of state governments to
allocate full pension obligations, and (3) lax or altering pension legislation. Research on the
various reasons for the widening gap between state liabilities and pension funding has been
successful in bringing to light detrimental activities and isolating problematic programs or
systems. Another avenue of research has focused on ways to mitigate the impact of pension
underfunding. Included in the research are alternatives to overcome pension underfunding
problems via investment strategies or updating a system altogether (i.e. shifting from a deferred
benefit retirement system to a deferred compensation system or a hybrid of both). While these
avenues of research are important to understanding the problem, much less attention has been
given to successful systems.
Opportunities for further research should focus on systems that are meeting and/or
exceeding expectations, in terms of funding their retirement systems. In doing so, the
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characteristics of these successful systems could be identified and potentially implemented in the
states that are lagging. Of explicit concern to this paper, attention will be given to the governance
structure of pension program boards and how governance structure and characteristics impact the
performance of pension programs. Are there characteristics of program boards that significantly
influence their performance? This question will be addressed in future sections of the paper.
After performing an analysis of the available data, recommendations will be offered for program
considerations. While certain characteristics might be difficult to duplicate (or implement), at
least with a roadmap towards success, states could attempt to right the ship that has been off
course for far too long.

Literature Review
In 2000, Michael Useem and Olivia Mitchell sought to study the relationship between
pension system characteristics and performance measurements. Their initial hypothesis was that
certain pension system characteristics and governance policies would directly influence the
performance outcomes of the respective pension systems. Ultimately, they would conclude that
the direct impact of these variables was not on the performance results but rather on the
investment decisions of the pension systems.
The pension system characteristics or governance policies that they examined included:
board size, board composition, investment restrictions, independent performance evaluations,
asset allocation responsibility of the board, and direct investment decision responsibility of the
board. The investment categories considered by the authors included: tactical investment, equity
investment, outside investment management, and international investment. Their data was
obtained from a series of surveys conducted in 1993 for the Public Pension Coordinating Council
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(Zorn, 1994) and a follow up survey from 1996 (Zorn, 1996). The follow up survey provided the
authors the necessary data to draw conclusions pertaining to the characteristic influence on
investment strategy decisions. Although the data was not discussed in great detail in their article,
supporting articles (Zorn 1994 and 1996) attest to the reliability and completeness of the data
which tends to indicate sound results.
Through the use of a multivariate regression technique, Useem and Mitchell were able to
show that certain pension system characteristics influenced the investment decisions of a
program as opposed to directly influencing its performance outcome. The list of variables that
were shown to significantly influence investment decisions included: investment restrictions,
independent performance evaluations, board composition and board size. For example,
independent performance evaluations were shown to negatively impact the tactical investment
strategy, have a slightly positive influence on the outside management and international
management strategies, and had a significantly positive influence on the equity investment
strategy (Useem & Mitchell, 2000). The authors then took their findings pertaining to investment
strategies and examined the impact that specific strategies had on actual rates of return.
In the second part of their analysis, Useem and Mitchell (2000) were able to determine
that investment strategies could have as much as a two percentage point impact on actual returns
on investment. For large pension programs, a two percentage point impact could mean the gain
or loss in the tens of millions of dollars. While the results could be of significance for large and
small programs alike, the second part of their analysis lacked a detailed explanation of their
methods used. In light of these limitations, the impact of their findings as related to the impact of
pension system characteristics cannot be overlooked. It is from their research that the basis for
the current study was born.
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Useem and Mitchell concluded in their article from 2000, that characteristics of pension
systems could influence, albeit indirectly, the performance of pension systems. By utilizing some
of the same variables that were discussed by the authors, in particular pension board size and
updating the data source to more current figures, the relationship between pension system
characteristics and performance outcomes can be examined to determine if any of the same
relationships still hold true in today. In addition, current data would include measurements from
a significant period spanning an economic recession the likes of which have not been
encountered for several decades. The significance of the recession should be considered and the
impact that it could and did have on pension systems should not be overlooked.
Although most private systems are set up in different program styles than that of public
systems (i.e. deferred compensation vs. deferred benefit), there has been a migration in recent
years by public systems to take on more characteristics of the private sector. Even if private
pension systems are different than public, a lot can be learned by examining studies that focus on
the private systems; one such example is a study completed by Ippolito and Turner in 1987.
Using data available from the U.S. Department of Labor from 1977-83 (more specifically, 5500
Annual Report data) the authors examined the different investment strategies and the actual rates
of return that various plans realized during the specified time period. One of the characteristics
that they focused on was the investment strategy utilized by the private pension programs. Their
results are important because they found that investment strategies do in fact influence the rates
of return. For example, plans that implemented a stock trading practice or strategy saw a
decrease on their rates of return by approximately 60 basis points relative to plans that did not
implement the same strategy (Ippolito & Turner, 1987).
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These investment strategy results from Ippolito & Turner should be considered by public
pension systems as they could be a significant factor behind recent performance measurements.
That is, how a fund invests its assets should be accounted for in a model assessing pension
characteristics. A plan with heavy stock investments might behave differently or see different
performance results when compared to plans invested primarily in real estate or short term
investments.
In the wake of the financial recession of the mid-late 2000’s, the implications on possible
investment strategies by pension systems should be examined. The strategies that they have
implemented in recent years could have a significant impact on the current rates of return. Some
17 years after Ippolito and Turner’s study, the same relationship could still hold significant. By
pulling data from Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research, the investment strategies of
individual public pension systems could be deduced and evaluated against the respective
performance measurements of each system. While Ippolito and Turner’s study was of private
pension systems, the results can be applied to the public system debate given the current move of
public systems to adopt more private system modeling.
A final paper that should be considered when examining the influence of a pension
programs’ governance structure is David Hess’ 2005 article, “Protecting and Politicizing Public
Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and
Practices”. One substantial finding from this report pertained to the influential power of the
pension board members’ investment expertise level. Specifically, Hess (2005) found that
investment performance was negatively impacted when the board made asset allocation
decisions. This would indicate that pension board members do not hold the necessary expertise
to make investment decisions on behalf of the programs they represent. This finding is
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significant in relation to the current study as roughly 65 percent of the pension boards used in
this study have an investment council making investment decisions. This will be explained and
expanded in later sections.
A second significant finding in Hess’ paper was that the composition of the board will
significantly impact the programs’ performance. More specifically, the percentage of board
members that are appointed or elected to their position and by whom they are chosen
significantly influences pension performance. Hess (2005) found that board members elected by
plan members improved the overall plan performance. These individuals appear to be capable of
preventing the government misuse of plan assets. Hess’ results are significant and should not be
overlooked. Although other authors have provided significant findings and have laid the
framework for present research, Hess’s findings not only expand on these prior works but do so
using a more current data source. His data was obtained from a series of state and local pension
system surveys conducted by the Government Finance Officers Association and the Public
Pension Coordinating Council between the years of 1990 and 2000 (2005). The analysis below
pulls on prior research for guidance while utilizing the most current data stream available
pertaining to state and local pension programs to address whether or not governance
characteristics influence pension performance.

Research Design
Variables & Model
Measuring the performance of a public pension program is a topic that has generated
much debate. Useem & Mitchell (2000) measured performance based on actual rates of return
while others, Munnell et al. (2011), have used program funded ratio as the basis to measure
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performance. A program that can isolate the characteristics that improve performance and can
adequately integrate them in to their own program could potentially reap the benefits of
improved performance and stability. The intent of this paper is to present an analysis of the
available data and isolate possible pension characteristics that impact performance. In turn,
program managers and politicians can assess their respective programs and make changes where
potential opportunities might lie.
There are several analytical tools that could be used to aid in the research related to
pension program characteristics. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Mixed Effects Logistic
(ME) regression models are two such examples and will be implemented to perform the analysis
in the following section. These modeling systems require identification of a dependent variable
and a list of explanatory variables. The dependent variable, or performance measurement, has
been identified as the funded ratio of a program. The funded ratio is determined by dividing a
plan’s assets by its obligations or liabilities. In a report from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2008) it was indicated that a pension plan would be at risk of default if
the funded ratio was less than 80 percent funded. In terms of performance, a program can not
only use the 80 percent threshold to measure their stability but also as a point to measure how
much of an impact their decisions have on their funded ratio. That is, are decisions being made
that will increase or decrease their funded ratio and how much of an impact will the decisions
have on the funded ratio?
The next phase is to determine which variables will be included as explanatory variables
for the regression model. Of particular concern is the potential impact that pension program
governance characteristics have on the performance of the programs. Therefore, the specific
governance characteristic variables that will be included are: (1) the number of board members
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for a given program, (2) the number of board members that are actually participants of their
program, and (3) whether or not there is an investment council present to make investment
decisions. It is possible that specific characteristics of the board members (i.e. how they were
elected, age, financial qualifications) could be included as well. However, the limited availability
of this information prevented their inclusion in the analysis. Table 1 below outlines the three
target variables and the expected impact of each on the model.
Table 1. Target explanatory variables and expected impact
Variable
totbrd
prctparticpbrd

invcncl

Description
Total board members
Percentage of active
board members in the
program they serve
Designates the
presence of an
investment council

Expected Impact
Negative
Positive

Positive

The coefficient of the total board members variable is expected to be negative because as
more members are added, there are more opinions and ideas that must be weighed by the board.
In addition, there could be additional political pressures applied on board members to appease a
group or individual that got them elected or appointed. In this case, by listening to others, their
decisions could be swayed to the detriment of the pension program. Rather than use the total
number of board members covered by the programs that they serve, this model considers the
percentage of board members. This is due to the fact that the dependent variable is measured in
percentages. It is expected that as the percentage of board members that are current program
participants increases, there will be a positive impact on the funded ratio. Prior research has
indicated that when board members are plan participants they have more at stake in the plans
success compared to a non-participant (Munnell, 2011). Covered board members have a vested
interest to see the program prosper and stay adequately funded because they will reap the
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benefits from their decisions. Finally, the presence of an investment council is expected to have a
positive impact on the funded ratio. While some board members might have the training to make
financial or investment decisions not all have the same aptitudes. By taking the investment
decisions out of their hands it allows them to instead focus on other issues (i.e. determining
employee contribution rates). An investment council can devote all of their attention to making
the most financial sound investments decisions without having to worry about other issues or
appeasing political whims. In turn, sound investment decisions should lead to a higher funded
ratio.
In addition to the target governance variables, the following list of control variables will
also be considered: total number of program participants, whether or not program participants are
covered by social security, annual required contribution (ARC) rates, and the jurisdiction of the
programs (state vs. locality). The table below provides a description of the variables and the
expected impact of each on the model.
Table 2. Additional explanatory variables and expected impact
Variable
members
Sscov

Arc

jurisdiction

prct_eecrate

Description
Total number of
program member
Designates whether
program members are
covered by Social
Security
Annual Required
Contribution (in
thousands of dollars)
Designates whether
the program is a state
or local program
Percentage of
employee pay paid in
to a program

Expected Impact
Negative
Positive

Negative

Positive

Positive
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The variables expected to have a negative impact on the funded ratio are the total number
of program members and the annual required contribution rates. As a program grows, logic
would suggest that the funded ratio might increase; more people equals more money coming in.
However, there are a few explanations to counter this logic. First, if the program is growing, it
could be from non-contributing members or retiree beneficiaries. Additionally, as programs
grow, there are increased future liabilities which require additional funding in order to cover
pension payments. If programs do not increase their funding methods in order to cover the
additional liabilities, as the liabilities grow the funded ratio will decrease. The annual required
contribution (ARC) is an actuarially determined amount that must be contributed by employers,
in this case localities and states. The ARC is set to not only fund current liabilities but also future
liabilities. Since ARC payments are paid by governments, their budgets must reflect the need to
make good on the ARC payments. As ARC increases, additional funds must be allocated by
governments to cover the increasing costs. In turn, if they increase too much or to fast, there
would likely be political unwillingness to contribute more than in previous years to fund the
ARC. It is for this reason that the expected impact of the ARC variable is negative.
The variables expected to have a positive impact on the funded ratio are whether or not
program participants are covered by social security, the jurisdiction of the program, and the
employee contribution percentage. The jurisdiction variable indicates whether or not a plan is
operated at the state level or the local level. It is anticipated that the larger state managed plans
would have a better or higher funded ratio due to the presence of additional resources (monetary
or not) that small cities lack. Therefore, the estimated impact should be positive signifying that a
state plan would have a positive impact on the funded ratio. The employee contribution
percentage measures how much of their pay a public employee must contribute towards the
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retirement program. It is expected that as this rate increases, the funded ratio would be positively
influenced. In most programs, all employees pay the same rate. Therefore, by increasing the
required contribution percentage, a plan would bring in more money and therefore see gains on
their funded ratio. The final variable indicates whether or not program participants are covered
by Social Security. It is expected that if plan participants are covered by Social Security, the plan
could offer a reduction in future benefits to employees as Social Security payments would
supplement their retirement payments. As such, future liabilities would begin to decrease. As a
result, the funded ratio would improve with lower future liabilities.
The final variable is a variable to measure the impact of time or year. The data includes
measurements for the years 2002 through 2009. Measurements from 2001 have been exlucded as
the base year for analysis. Given the recent economic recession, the time variable is expected to
have a negative impact on the funded ratio. That is to say for each year beyond the base year, the
funded ratio is expected to decrease by a given percentage to account for the economic and
financial instability in the country. By combining the list of dependent and independent variables
with the variable for years, the regression model is as follows:
(1) actfundratio = constant + β1*totbrd + β2* prctparticpbrd + β3* invcncl + β4* members +
β5* sscov + β6* arc + β7* jurisdiction + β8* prct_eecrate + β9* year + ε
Data
All data utilized in this analysis has been collected from the database Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College (2013). This database has annual data from 2001-2009
related to state and local pension/retirement programs for all 50 states and select localities. Minor
manipulation of the variables has occurred as outlined in the previous sections.
Table 3 below provides the summary statistics from the analysis:
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Table 3. Summary statistics
Variable
Funded Ratio
Total Board Size
Percentage of
Board Covered
by Plan
Total Members
Annual Required
Contribution
(ARC)
Employee
Contribution
Percentage
N = 958

Mean
84.337
9.884
56.546

Std. Dev.
16.613
3.450
23.070

Min
19.1
1
0

Max
147.7
20
100

181255

231099

3246

1631769

452579

704093

0

7242802

5.668

2.872

0

17.25

Funded ratio, percentage of board members that are plan participants, and employee
contribution percentage are all measured in percentages. Total board size and total program
members are both measured as their actual values or numbers. ARC is measured in thousands of
dollars. The two figures that should be addressed are the minimum values of zero for ARC and
employee contribution percentages. These are actual values and not omissions by their respective
programs. For at least on measurement there were programs that did not require a set percentage
of required employee contribution nor was an ARC established either actuarially or by statutory
regulation.
The dummy variables included measuring the presence of an investment council, whether
or not program participants are covered by social security and whether a program is operated by
a state or city have all been reported in percentages. See Tables 4 -6, respectively, below.
Table 4. Percentage of programs with and without an investment council
With Investment Council
Without Investment Council
Total

65.19
34.81
100.00
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Table 5. Percentage of programs with and without members covered by Social Security
With Members Covered
Without Members Covered
Total

75.40
24.60
100.00

Table 6. Programs that are and are not state managed
Are not state managed (locally managed)
Are state managed
Total

15.08
84.92
100.00

Results & Analysis
The regression methods utilized for this paper included Mixed Effects and Ordinary Least
Squares modeling. The computer program Stata was used to compute all results and conduct all
tests during the data analysis phase. The analysis began with first testing to determine whether a
fixed effects model or mixed effects model was most appropriate. Based on the Hausman test
results, the mixed effects model was indicated to be most appropriate. The first regression that
was computed using the previously defined model (1) was a Mixed Effects regression analysis.
The results of this analysis can be found in Appendix A.
The main independent variables returned results as predicted previously in Table 1.
However, the only significant estimate was the presence of an investment council. The generated
coefficient indicates that when an investment council is present the funded ratio is increased by
7.219 percent compared to the base year of 2001. This result supports the notion that investment
councils play an important role in the performance of a public retirement system. Systems that do
not currently have an investment council may want to consider implementing one in the future.
Although not significant at any level, the remaining target variables did return results as
expected or that have the expected impact on the funded ratio. As the number of total board
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members increases, the impact on the funded ratio is negative signifying that as boards get
larger, the overall funded ratio decreases. As the percentage of board members that are active
participants in their retirement systems increases, the funded ratio is positively influenced. This
relationship would support the theory that since active program participant board members have
a stake in the program performance, they would make decisions to secure their future benefits.
That is, since they have a vested interest in the fund performance, they would more closely
monitor its performance, including the funded ratio. Again, since both variables are not
significant, the magnitude of their impacts cannot be expanded upon at this time.
All remaining independent variables, except members covered by Social Security,
returned significant mixed effects results. Of particular importance are the impacts of the
jurisdiction of a program and the percentage rate of employee contributions. Both of these results
were not only significant but they were in the opposite direction as originally hypothesized. The
impact of jurisdiction was indicated to be negative at -10.05. This result indicates that when a
public retirement system is managed at the state level, the impact on the funded ratio is
decreased by 10.05 percentage points. Although the jurisdiction of most pension plans cannot be
changed, this result should highlight the negative impact that state governments have on the
performance of pension programs. Rather than being able to allocate additional resources to
program management, there is the potential that a states increased size and capability is a
hindrance and not a benefit. Even though the variable measuring the impact of members covered
by Social Security was not significant, it did return a result with a positive coefficient as
predicted. While nothing can be concluded regarding the magnitude of influence, it should be
noted that the presence of a program to supplement retirement payments had a positive impact on
the funded ratio.

Public Retirement Systems

19

The second regression tool that was utilized to examine model (1) was Ordinary Least
Squares. The OLS regression results can be found in Appendix B. All three target independent
variables returned significant estimates. The impact due the presence of an investment council on
the funded ratio is an increase of 7.841 percentage points when an investment council is present.
Like the Mixed Effects results, programs should consider implementing an investment council if
they have not already done so given the potential positive performance results. In terms of the
total board members and percentage of board members that are program participants, the results
not only matched the predicted impacts but are now significant. For each additional board
member added, the funded ratio decreases by 0.506 percentage points. When the percentage of
covered board members increases by one percent the funded ratio increases by 0.0626 percentage
points. While governments may not want to consider increasing the board size of a program, they
should however, consider adding members that have a vested interest in the performance of the
program.
As was the case with the Mixed Effects results, the only non-significant independent
variable was the presence of members being covered by Social Security. It cannot be said with
any degree of certainty what the magnitude of impact is estimated to be from members being
covered by Social Security but it can be generalized that there is a negative impact to the funded
ratio. This result was different than originally hypothesized and contradicts the Mixed Effects
results. The OLS estimate signifies that supplemental programs actually hinder the performance
of the retirement system rather than boost the performance results.
In both models the estimates for the time variables are significant. In general, any year
beyond the base year of 2001 has a negative impact on the funded ratio. The estimates in the
Appendices represent the percentage decrease in funded ratio for each respective year. For
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example, the OLS estimate for year 2008 is negative 13.50. This signifies a decrease in the
funded ratio by 13.50 percentage points compared to the base year of 2001 for any program
measurement from 2008. While not explicitly outlined previously, this result was expected given
the recent economic crisis and recession during the middle to late 2000’s.

Conclusion
Fact: Public pension and retirement systems are significantly underfunded. There is some
discrepancy as to what the true magnitude of the actual unfunded liability is but it can be agreed
that it is growing year by year. Previous research has been successful in identifying the cases of
being underfunded but more research is needed to help get these systems out of the hole they
have dug for themselves.
One approach towards improving the future of the public retirement system is to examine
the past performance of programs and to implement the characteristics that have a positive
impact on performance. Although financial and demographic characteristics are important to
dissecting performance so too are program governance characteristics. By utilizing the most
recent data from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, OLS and Mixed Effects
models have been generated to try and identify governance characteristics that programs should
consider implementing. The results of the current analysis signify that public retirement systems
should investigate the addition of an investment council to make investment decisions. For those
programs that already have an investment council present, their funded ratios are increased by
over 7 percent compared to those that do not have their own investment council. While the
results of adding additional board members and allowing board members to participate in the
retirement program were mixed, these characteristics should not be overlooked. With further
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model specification and the use of data beyond 2010 as the information is reported, public
retirement systems should be able to identify the characteristics that most greatly influence
performance. Public systems at all levels need to be carefully examined and consider all options
if the underfunded problem is ever going to be addressed and curbed.
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Appendix A. Mixed Effects regression results modeling effect on account funded ratio
N = 958
VARIABLES

Estimates

(std. error)

-0.426

(0.417)

0.0432

(0.0594)

7.219**
1.21e-05**

(2.831)
(5.67e-06)

2.211

(3.226)

-1.76e-06**
-10.05***

(7.85e-07)
(3.667)

-0.814***

(0.306)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

0
-5.488***
-9.253***
-11.39***
-13.12***
-13.31***
-12.06***
-14.72***
-19.31***

(0)
(0.890)
(0.888)
(0.886)
(0.893)
(0.900)
(0.905)
(0.916)
(0.936)

Constant

106.2***

(6.365)

Total Board
Members
Percentage of Board
Covered by Program
Investment Council
Total Program
Members
Members Covered by
Social Security
Arc
State or Local
Program
Percentage of
Employee
Contribution

Number of id
112
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B. OLS Regression results modeling effect on account funded ratio
N = 958
VARIABLES

Estimates

(std. error)

Total Board
Members
Percentage of Board
Covered by Program
Investment Council
Total Program
Members
Members Covered by
Social Security
Arc
State or Local
Program
Percentage of
Employee
Contribution

-0.506***

(0.171)

0.0626***

(0.0228)

7.841***
2.87e-05***

(1.059)
(3.86e-06)

-0.411

(1.312)

-8.40e-06***
-11.41***

(1.29e-06)
(1.208)

-1.192***

(0.214)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

-5.673**
-9.212***
-11.14***
-12.35***
-12.51***
-10.80***
-13.50***
-17.25***

(2.253)
(2.194)
(2.091)
(2.124)
(2.098)
(2.096)
(2.098)
(2.166)

Constant

109.9***

(3.143)

R-squared

0.301
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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